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Article 6

NOTES
DOCTuNE

OF ABSTENTION:

NEED

OF R.EAPPRAISAL

I. The Nature of Abstention
The judicially created doctrine of abstention permits a federal court to abstair
from hearing a given case in order to let a state court clarify uncertain state law.'
The abstention doctrine, which has its foundation in equity, 2 is most often used to
avoid constitutional issues and to promote comity within the federal system.3 Avoidance of constitutional questions has always been an implicit requirement of prudent
judicial restraint. For example, if a case arises in which state law is uncertain and
there is a federal constitutional question, the federal courts will refrain from making
a constitutional determination, pending a state court interpretation of the statute's
applicability which could moot the constitutional issue.4
Abstention is also implicitly required by the nature of our federal system.
Within that system, state and federal courts have overlapping jurisdiction. State
courts often decide federal law and federal courts decide state law. Inevitable
'friction between the two sovereigns requires a conscious effort on the part of the
judiciary to achieve some sort of comity. In this attempt at comity, the abstention
doctrine is a valuable tool in the hands of federal courts. A workable accommodation
is achieved by allowing the state courts to decide issues of state law when a clash
with state policy appears imminent and the state law needs interpretation. 5
The doctrine of abstention was first fully expressed in the fairly recent case of
Railroad Comm'n of Texas v. Pullman Co.6 In that case, an attack was made

in federal court on the constitutionality of a state regulation prescribing certain
requirements for the operation of Pullman sleeping cars. The court held that resolution of the question of unconstitutional discrimination should be withheld pending

initiation of state court proceedings leading to a definitive construction of the state
statute under which the state commission acted. This decision was predicated on
the traditional discretion of a chancellor in issuing an injunction. If the chancel-

lor deemed that issuing an injunction in a certain situation was contrary to public
policy, he could deny the request. The Supreme Court reasoned that granting an
injunction prior to a state court determination of the statute's validity would be
violative of a public policy that favors refraining from decisions on constitutional

questions when a case can be decided on other grounds.7

The area of abstention has broadened in scope since the Pullman decision. It

is now employed in the area of state administrative action,8 of taxation,9 and of

I See generally WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 52 (Ist ed. 1963); 1 BARRON & HOLTZOrF,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AD PROCEDURE § 64 (Wright ed. 1960); IA MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1
0.203 (2nd ed. 1961 ). There are a number of law review articles that give general treatment to
the doctrine of abstention. See generally Wright, The Abstention Doctrine Reconsidered, 37
TEXAS L. REv. 815 (1959); Note, 73 HARV. L. Rav. 1358 (1960); Note, 59 COLUM. L. Rxv.
749 (1959); Note, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 226 (1959).
2 Railroad Comm'n of Texas v. Pullman, 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
3 WRIOHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 52 at 169 (Ist ed. 1963) gives four reasons:
(1) to avoid decision of a federal constitutional question where the case
may be disposed of on questions of state law;
(2)
to avoid needless conflict with the administration by a state of its
own affairs;
(3) to leave to thd states the resolution of unsettled questions of state law;
(4) to ease the congestion of the federal court docket.
The latter two reasons, however, have never been explicitly approved by the United States
Supreme Court.
4 Railroad Comm'n of Texas v. Pullman, 312 U.S. 496 (1941). For a list of Pullman
type cases see WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 52 n. 6 (1st ed. 1963).
5 See Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Southern Ry. Co., 341 U.S. 363 (1951); Burford
v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
6 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
7 Id. at 501.
8 Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Southern Ry. Co., 341 U.S. 363 (1951); Burford v.
Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943). These cases brought into the abstention area the federalstate comity consideration as a basis for exercising the doctrine.
9 See Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. V. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293 (1943).

NOTRE DAME LAWYER
eminent domain. 10 Even prior to Pullman, abstention had been used in a receiver-

ship appointment case" and in a bankruptcy case.1 2 The sine qua non for the exercise of the abstention doctrine is that the state law for which the federal court
is seeking an interpretation be of an uncertain nature. A distinction should be made
between "difficult" or "unclear" areas of state law and those of an "uncertain"
nature. The former terms may be used when there is some sort of state law interpreiation available to the federal courts, while the latter implies that there is an
absence of state authority. The United States Supreme Court has never held that
mere "difficulty" of state law is a sufficient reason for abstention.21 The general
test employed has been the "uncertain state law plus" test 14which had been taken
to mean uncertain state law plus exceptional circumstances.
Those who espouse the abstention doctrine have recognized that the doctrine
should have certain limitations. It should not be merely an instrument of judicial
convenience.' 5 Thus, the test of "exceptional circumstances" was established in

Meredith v. Winter Haven.", The court in Meredith said that, in order to apply

the abstention doctrine, state law must be of an uncertain nature and a question
of constitutionality or federal-state comity must be present. However, where the
state procedure is inadequate, the federal courts generally refuse to abstain.' 7 Simi-

larly, there is a reluctance to use the doctrine when civil rights are involved.' This
reluctance extends to any actions involving private parties and not involving either
state action or constitutional questions. 9 Finally, the federal courts have traditionally employed the doctrine
to equitable issues only since the discretion of
20
the chancellor was so limited.

Three alternatives are available to a court deciding to abstain. First, the federal court may decide that it should retain jurisdiction while submitting all the
issues in the case for state court determination. By retaining jurisdiction pending
a state court decision "to be brought with reasonable promptness," the federal
court may protect the parties against unreasonable delay. 2 ' This method of dis10
11

See Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1960).
See Pennsylvania v. Williams, 294 U.S. 176 (1935).

12 See Thompson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 309 U.S. 478 (1940).
13 See, e.g., Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472, 492 (1949).
14 Meredith v. City of Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228 (1943) is the case most often cited
for this proposition. "Exceptional circumstances" has been generally taken by the United States
Supreme Court to mean the existence of a federal constitutional question or a serious threat
to federal-state comity. But see, Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S.
25 (1959).
15 While Meredith appears to preclude federal courts from employing abstention in the
name of judicial convenience, two lower federal court cases seem to have based their decision
to abstain on just such a ground. In Mottolese v. Kaufman, 176 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1940) the
court abstained pending determination of a state suit where similar actions were consolidated.
In Beiersodorf & Co. v. McGohey, 187 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1951) abstention was applied on the
ground of an overcrowded docket.
16 320 U.S. 228, 237 (1943) where the court said that:
To remit the parties to the state courts is to delay further the disposition of the litigation which has been pending for more than two years and
which is now ready for decision. It is to penalize petitioners for resorting to
a jurisdiction which they were entitled to invoke, in the absence of any
special circumstances which would warrant refusal to exercise it. [emphasis
added]
17 E.g., In Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 327 (1943) the court said that "Texas
courts can give full as great relief, including temporary restraining orders, as federal courts."
In Railroad Comm'n of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 501 (1941) the court declared:
"The law of Texas appears to furnish easy means for determining the Commission's authority."
18 See Griffin v. County School Bd. of Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218 (1964);
But see Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167 (1959).
19 But see United Services Life Ins. Co. v. Delaney, 328 F.2d 483 (1964).
20 Two recent United States Supreme Court cases suggest that the legal-equitable distinction may no longer be determinative. See Clay v. Sun Ins. Office Ltd., 363 U.S. 207 (1960);
Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959).
21 See Railroad Comm'n of Texas v. Pullman, 312 U.S. 496, 502 (1941).
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position may save one of the parties from irreparable injury during the course of
decide any
the litigation in the state courts. 22 Further, it allows federal courts 2to
3
unresolved federal issues that may remain after the state court acts. •
The second method is excision of a single issue to the state court for its determination. Such a state determination is limited to the issue submitted - in contrast 24to retention, where the federal court submits all the issues for state determination.
Finally, the court may order an outright dismissal of the suit when there appears to be no need of a federal forum for the determination of subsequent federal issues. The theory is that outright dismissal under these circumstances prevents any possibility of federal interference with state action.
The United States Supreme Court has never set forth a criterion as to what
method of disposition should be' used in a given situation. Therefore, lacking
in a given case, the Supreme
guidelines, we can only use hindsight to discover why,
25
Court felt that a particular method was preferable.
The doctrine of abstention has not been immune from criticism. It has been
argued that rightful invocation of a federal court's jurisdiction imposes a duty upon
the court to assume jurisdiction. 26 In the diversity area, the Guaranty Trust Co. v.
York 27 interpretation of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins 8 posited the view that a federal court
should hear state issues as if they were courts of the state in which the controversy
arose.29 However, the federal court still has a statutory duty to hear that case. The
policy behind federal diversity of citizenship jurisdiction is to assure a nonresident
of an unbiased hearing. It can be argued that abstention in diversity cases is an
abnegation of the responsibility to provide an unbiased and neutral forum. Further,
it has been alleged that the doctrine needlessly causes delay and expense by relegating a party to a state court even though there is a possibility of having to come
back into federal court for the determination of federal issues. 30 In many situations,
the federal court's abstention as to certain issues divides the case into parts: the
state court deciding state issues and then the federal court the federal questions.2 1
This frequently results in inefficiency, burdening an already overburdened state
and federal judiciary.
Abstention is defended as a mere "postponement" of decision until the state
law has been ascertained, as distinguished from neglect of duty. 2 Thus, if the
22 See AFL v. Watson, 327, U.S. 582, 599 (1946) (threat of wholesale prosecution under
state law by zealous law enforcement officials); Chicago, D. & G.B. Transit Co. v. Nims, 252
F.2d 317, 320-21 (6th Cir. 1958) (continuing jurisdiction to prevent prosecution by the Commission of Revenue of the State of Michigan).
23 Note, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1358, 1359-61 (1960).
24 'This method has been sparingly used by the United States Supreme Court. E.g., Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1960); Leiter, Inc. v. United
States, 352 U.S. 220 (1957); Thompson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 309 U.S. 478 (1940).
25 For a more complete discussion of the methods of disposition see Note, 59 CoLum. L.
Rav. 749, 771-76 (1959).
26 E.g., Meredith v. City of Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 234 (1943). For a discussion
of the concept of duty see Note, 59 CoLUm. L. RaV. 749, 776-78 (1959).
27 326 U.S. 99 (1945)."
28 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
29 A paradox in the diversity area is that federal courts are asked to decide difficult questions of state law and yet these decisions do not make state law. An argument for the use of
the abstention doctrine when "difficult" questions of state law arise is that those who make the
law should decide it.
30 See Kurland, Toward a Cooperative judicial Federalism: The Federal Court Abstention Doctrine, 24 F.R.D. 481, 490 (1959).
31 See Government and Civil Employees Organizing Comm'n v. Windsor, 116 F. Supp.

354 (N.D. Ala. 1953), aff'd, 347 U.S. 901 (1954), 262 Ala. 285, 78 So.2d 646 (1955), 146

F. Supp. 214 (N.D. Ala. 1956), 353 U.S. 364 (1957). This case involved five years of litiga-

tion which included two trips to the United States Supreme Court and two visits to the state

Supreme Court.
32 In Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167, 177 (1959) the court said: "This principle does-

not, of course, involve the abdication of federal jurisdiction, but only the postponement of its
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method of disposition is retention of the suit and federal questions remain after
the state determination of the suit, a party is not thereby precluded from a federal court hearing. Similarly, if after a party has exhausted his state remedies and
the case is dismissed in federal court on the ground of "res judicata," a party
has recourse to the United States Supreme Court. Under this view, the delay and
increased expense from abstention might be considered incidents of having a federal
system.
II. The 1959 Supreme Court Decisions
A "re-evaluation" of the doctrine of abstention took place in 1959 when the
United States Supreme Court decided four abstention cases. 3 In Martin v. Creasy,34
landowners abutting a certain highway attempted to enjoin the State from designating the highway as one of "limited access." The basis of their suit was the unconstitutionality of the state law which allegedly failed to provide compensation for
their loss of access to the highway. The Supreme Court held that the case, which had
been reopened in the Federal District Court,5 should be stayed pending state proceedings since the Pennsylvania courts had already held that there was a state
forum available for the appropriate resolution of this case and the case was awaiting
state court determination. 8 This case is within the tradition of previous abstention
cases. It is a further exemplification of the fact that the Supreme Court recognizes
the use of abstention to avoid constitutional issues when state law is uncertain.
The second case, Alleghany County v. Frank Mashuda Co. 37 had been commenced in federal district court by certain landowners who had had their land
condemned by the county. They sought to obtain ejectment and an injunction
on the ground that the land condemned was not going to be used for a public
purpose. The Federal District Court had dismissed for the reason that the entire
problem could be resolved in the proceedings already before the state supreme
9
court.38 This decision was reversed by the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.A
The Supreme Court, in holding that the District Court judge had abused his discretion in abstaining, said that: "Abdication of the obligation to decide cases can
be justified under this doctrine only in the exceptional circumstances where the
order to the parties to repair to the state court would clearly serve an inportant
countervailing interest." 40 The Court went on to point out that:
The only question for decision is the purely factual question whether the
County expropriated the respondent's land for private rather than for public use. The District Court would simply be acting as would a court of the
State in applying to the facts of this case the settled state policy that a
County may not take a private citizen's land under the State's power of
eminent domain except for public use."

Mr. Justice Brennan's majority opinion emphasized that "a State's power of eminent domain no more justifies abstention than the fact that it involved any other
issue related to sovereignty."' 2 Mr. Justice Clark wrote a dissenting opinion in
exercise; it serves the policy of comity inherent in the doctrine of abstention; and it spares the
federal courts of unnecessary constitutional adjudication."
33 Martin v. Creasy, 360 U.S. 219 (1959); County of Alleghany v. Frank Mashuda Co.,
360 U.S. 185 (1959); Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167 (1959); Louisiana Power & Light
Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959). For detailed analyses, see Kurland, Toward
a Cooperative Judicial Federalism: The Federal Court Abstention Doctrine, 24 F.R.D. 481
(1959); WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS, § 64 (1st ed. 1963); Note, 108 U. PA. L. Rxv. 226,
234-51 (1959).
34 360 U.S. 219 (1959).
35 160 F. Supp. 404 (W.D. Pa. 1958).
36 Creasy v. Lawler. 8 Pa. D. & C.2d 535 (1956), aff'd 389 Pa. 635, 133 A.2d 178 (1957).
37 360 U.S. 185 (1959).
38 154 F. Supp. 628, 629 (W.D. Pa. 1957).
39 256 F.2d 241 (3d Cir. 1958).
40 360 U.S. 185, 188-89 (1959).
41 Id. at 190.
42 Id. at 192. But see Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25,
26 (1959).
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which Justices Black, Frankfurter, and Harlan joined. Agreeing with the district
court, the dissenting judges believed that there were exceptional circumstances
justifying the employment of abstention. They recognized that while the question
of "taking" was before the federal court in this condemnation action, both the
question of "taking" and also the issue of damages was to come before the state
courts. They concluded that the "orderly and businesslike administration of justice, as well as the comity due Pennsylvania courts" would be served by abstaining. 4
The third case to be decided was Harrison v. NAACP.44 This suit involved
an appeal from the decision of a three-judge court which had declared three Virginia statutes unconstitutional as violative of the Fourteenth Amendment. 45 The
Supreme Court held that the District Court should have abstained from deciding
the constitutional question, as the state statutes left room for a construction by the
Virginia courts "which might avoid in whole or in part the necessity for federal
constitutional adjudication, or at least materially change the nature of the problem.')46

Mr. Justice Douglas, joined by Chief Justice Warren and Mr. Justice Brennan,
dissented on the theory that the District Court was under a duty to hear the case
since its jurdisdiction was invoked pursuant to the civil rights statutes.4 7 Further,
he declared that this was "a delaying tactic that may involve years of time and that
inevitably doubles the cost of litigation. When used widespread, [the abstention
doctrine] . .. dilutes the stature of the Federal District Courts, making them secondary tribunals in the administration of justice under the Federal Constitution. 4
The fourth 1959 case, and the one prompting the most comment, was Louisiana
Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux. 9 The municipality filed a petition in
state courts for expropriation of certain property owned by the company. The defendant removed the case to the Federal District Court. The District Court ordered
that the case be stayed until the Supreme Court of Louisiana had been given an
opportunity to interpret the state law that purportedly gave the city authority
to expropriate the property.50 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed.51
In upholding the District Court's abstention, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, writing for
the majority of the Court, said that the doctrine of abstention did not involve the
jurisdiction of a federal court but was a matter of judicial administration. Therefore, he concluded, employment of the doctrine was not a shirking of responsibility,
but a "postponement" of the court's decision. The Court attempted to distinguish
Meredith v. Winter Haven5 2 on the ground that it involved dismissal.53 Justice
Frankfurter further argued that eminent domain with "its basis in the roots of
sovereign power" 54 was especially appropriate for state court determination. Mr.
Justice Stewart in his concurring opinion noted that in the Alleghany County case,55
unlike Thibodaux, dismissal of the suit was involved, the state law was clear, and
factual questions were the only ones left for the federal court to decide.
The dissenters argued that, when the jurisdiction of a federal court is properly
43 360 U.S. 185, 201 (1959) (dissenting opinion).
44 360 U.S. 167 (1959).
45 159 F. Supp. 503 (E.D. Va. 1958).
46 Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167, 177 (1959). This case suggests that abstention is
not precluded when federal jurisdiction is invoked pursuant to the civil rights statutes, even
though the supremacy of the federal law, violations of personal freedom and the possibility of
delaying tactics are involved. But see Griffin v. County School Bd. of Prince Edward County,
377 U.S. 218 (1964); McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668 (1963).
47 16 Stat. 144 (1870), 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1957).
48 360 U.S. 167, 180 (1959).
49 360 U.S. 25 (1959).
50 153 F.Supp. 515 (E.D.La. 1957).
51 255 F.2d 774 (5th Cir. 1958).
52 320 U.S. 228 (1943).
53 Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 27 n.2 (1959).
54 Id. at 29.
55 360 U.S. 185 (1959).
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invoked, the duty to decide the case then and there cannot be ignored except to
avoid constitutional issues or to preserve the delicate balance between state and
federal governments endangered by a federal decision. They emphasized that: (1)
this was not an equitable action to which the doctrine of abstention had been
traditionally limited; (2) conflict with paramount federal law was absent; (3)
there was no interference with the state administrative process. They concluded
that such an act of abstention was merely for the convenience of the federal court
and was in part based upon the majority's antipathy for diversity jurisdiction. They
also noted that the eminent domain situation was no more related to sovereignty
than other factual situations where abstention was denied. The dissent admonished
the majority, saying that if the court was overruling Meredith it should say so.
Analysis of the 1959 decisions and their impact on the abstention doctrine reveal that these decisions left a number of unsolved problems. Did the court in the
Thibodaux case intend to confer upon the district courts discretionary power to
abstain whenever they deemed state law uncertain or unclear, or was the holding
to be limited to eminent domain situations? Assuming discretionary power to abstain in situations where state law is uncertain, what is the test of uncertainty that
federal judges are to employ so they might avoid abusing their discretion? In distinguishing Meredith on the ground that the court dismissed rather than retained
jurisdiction did the Court impliedly give instructions to the district courts that they
should retain jurisdiction when abstaining? Did the Harrison decision imply that
the Supreme Court would ignore the invocation of federal jurisdiction under the
Civil Rights Act when a party was proceeding under an uncertain state law and
order abstention pending a state court determination of state law? What weight is
to be given the factor of delaying tactics in civil rights cases when the doctrine
of abstention is under consideration? Did the Supreme Court in the Thibodaux case
extend the use of the abstention doctrine to actions at law as well as suits in equity?
At least some of these questions have been answered by subsequent Supreme Court
decisions.
III Resolution of Problems After 1959
A. Law-Equity Distinction
Whether Thibodaux evidenced an end to the law-equity distinction in the abstention area was answered by the Supreme Court in Clay v. Sun Insurance Office
Ltd.5 6 The plaintiff, a citizen and resident of Illinois, bought an insurance policy in
Illinois from the defendant insurance company licensed to do business in both
Illinois and Florida. Subsequently the plaintiff moved to Florida and there brought
suit on the insurance policy in Federal District Court. The defendant claimed that
application of Florida law to the instant case would be unconstitutional. The Supreme Court said that the federal court should not pass on the constitutional question without a prior state court determination of the applicability of the local law.
Under this view, the defendant's objection was premature and abstention was
proper since it was not clear that the Florida courts would apply Florida law.
Since the Clay case concerned purely legal issues the application of the
abstention doctrine arguably means an end to the traditional reservation of the
doctrine to equity. Although the Florida certification procedure facilitated abstention, the Court implied that it 57would have reached the same determination even
in the absence of this procedure.

B. Civil Rights
In Harrison v. NAACP 58 the majority of the Supreme Court failed to single
out civil rights cases as deserving special treatment when the question of abstention
56
1961),
57
58

363 U.S. 207 (1960), certified question answered affirmatively, 133 So.2d 735 (Fla.
319 F.2d 505 (5th Cir. 1963). rev'd, 377 U.S. 179 (1964).
Clay v. Sun Ins. Office Ltd., 363 U.S. 207, 212 (1960).
360 U.S. 167 (1959).
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arose. But the Supreme Court was again confronted with the question of abstaining
in civil rights cases in two recent decisions. In McNeese v. Board of Educ.,5 9 Negro
public school students brought suit in Federal District Court pursuant to the Civil
Rights Act seeking to enjoin discrimination in an Illinois public school.60 The
Seventh Circuit affirmed,' the district court's dismissal of the case on the ground
that the plaintiffs had not exhausted their remedies under state administrative procedures. The Supreme Court, however, reversed, noting that there was "no underlying issue of state law controlling the litigation" and no state law that had to be
untangled before the case could proceed. For this reason, it is submitted, McNeese
can be reconciled with Harrison in which case the Supreme Court required abstention because an underlying issue of state law controlled the Civil Rights Act
litigation.
Similarly, the recent case of Griffin v. County School Bd. of Prince Edward
County62 is consistent with both McNeese and Harrison in that the presence or
absence of controlling state law is decisive. The Virginia school segregation laws
allegedly denied the "equal protection of the law" guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment. In reversing the Fourth Circuit, 3 the Supreme Court denied abstention, firstly, because the highest court of the state had passed on all the state
issues involved in the case0 4 and, secondly - and "quite independently," because
of the long delay resulting from state and county resistance. 5
While the Griffin case is reconcilable with Harrison and McNeese in that the
authoritative state court had passed on the state law issues thus leaving no uncertain state law, still the Supreme Court recognized an independent consideration.
It is this willingness to consider the element of delay in enforcing constitutional
rights that significantly distinguishes Griffin from Harrison.66 How far is the Court
willing to go in considering this factor? Is the mere possibility of delay in the state
court system a sufficient reason for refusing to abstain in the civil rights area? The
spirit of the Griffin decision clearly points in this direction. Certainly it was never
intended that abstention delay the enforcement of civil rights under federal law.
If this is attempted there is no reason why the federal courts should abstain.
C. Submission of Federal Issues To State Courts
The 1959 cases failed to answer the question of whether a party, once
abstention was authorized, had to submit his federal issues to the state courts for
their determination. A dilemma arose because the language of Government Employees Organizing Comm. v. Windsor 7 implied that the litigant was required to
submit his federal issues to the state court in order to aid that tribunal in construing
59
60
61

373 U.S. 668 (1963).
199 F. Supp. 403. 407 (E.D. IM. 1961).
305 F.2d 783 (7th Cir. 1962).

62 377 U.S. 218 (1964) (abstention denied).

63 322 F.2d 332 (4th Cir. 1963).
64 204 Va. 650, 133 S.E.2d 565 (1963) where the state Supreme Court upheld the validity under state law of the closing of the Prince Edward County public school system and gave
each county the option to pay for and operate, or not pay for and not operate, a public school
system.
65 Griffin v. County School Bd. of Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218, 229 (1964),
where the Supreme Court said that:
In the first place, the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia has already
passed upon the state law with respect to all the issues here ....
But quite
independently of this, we hold that the issues here imperatively call for decision now. The case has been delayed since 1951 by resistance at the state
and county level, by legislation, and by law suits ....
There has been entirely too much deliberation and not enough speed in enforcing the corstitutional ri.hts which we held in Brown v. Board of Education .... had been
denied Prince Edward County Negro children.
66 See Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167, 180 (1959) (Douglas dissenting).
67 353 U.S. 364 (1959).
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the state statute; and yet, if he did submit his federal issues, the principle of "res
judicata" would bar him from returning to federal court.
In England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners,68 the United States
Supreme Court resolved this dilemma. A number of chiropractors brought suit in
Federal District Court seeking injunctive relief from certain educational requirements for "medical practice" imposed by a Louisiana statute. They alleged that
the statute was inapplicable to them as chiropractors, and that in any event the
act was violative of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Federal District Court stayed
further proceedings until the state courts had an opportunity to rule on the reach of
the statute.6" In the Louisiana court the plaintiffs, following Windsor, "unreservedly submitted for decision, and briefed and argued their contention that the
act was unconstitutional.17 0 After an unfavorable decision,71 the plaintiffs sought to
return to the Federal District Court to have the constitutional question resolved
there. The suit was dismissed on the grounds that the Louisiana courts had already
ruled on the constitutionality of the act and that7 2the federal district courts do not
sit as forums of appeal from state court decisions.
The Supreme Court sympathized with the plaintiff's plight and clarified its
holding in Windsor: "The case does not mean that a party must litigate his federal
claims in the state courts, but only that he must inform those courts what his
federal claims are, so that the state statute may be construed 'in light of' those
claims.1 73 The Court defined the consequences when a party without reservation
submits his federal issues for state court determination: "We now explicitly hold
that if a party freely and without reservation submits his federal claims for decision
by the state courts, litigates them there, and has them decided there, then whether or not he seeks direct review of the state decision in this court - he has
elected to forego his right to return to the District Court." 74
In order for a party to have a hearing on his federal issues, he must reserve
them for federal court determination when he enters the state court. He may
make this reservation on the state court record or by a later showing that he did
not voluntarily fully litigate his federal claims in the state court.75 However, this
rule was to have prospective effect only since the chiropractors' misreading of
Windsor was not unreasonable.
Mr. Justice Douglas, while concurring in the judgment as to the plaintiffs,
could not agree with the majority holding as to future cases. He felt that the new
rule created a treacherous presumption in favor of state court determination of
federal issues which would trap the unwary.76
The England holding would appear to be an adequate solution to a very
vexing problem. Many times it is necessary for a state court to have an understanding of an entire case before deciding a state law question. This includes an
understanding of the federal issues involved. Yet before England, contrary to the
spirit of a federal court system, a party could be deprived of a federal forum for
his federal issues if he submitted his federal claims to a state court. Although
68 375 U.S. 411 (1964). There have been a number of recent law review articles on this
case: 50 A.B.A. J. 375 (1964); 64 COLUm. L. REv. 766 (1964); 52 ILL. B. J. 701 (1964);
35 Miss. L. J. 454 (1964); 38 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 359 (1964); 25 U. PITT. L. Rzv. 606
(1964).
69 180 F. Supp. 121, 124 (E.D. La. 1960).
70 375 U.S. 411, 413 (1964).
71 126 So.2d 51 (La. App. 1961).
72 194 F. Supp. 521, 522 (E.D. La. 1961).
73 England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 420 (1964).
74 Id. at 419.
75 The England court states that an explicit reservation, such as making the reservation
on the state court record is not always necessary. The Court said: "Such an explicit reservation is not indispensable; the litigant is in no event to be denied his right to return to the
District Court unless it appears that he voluntarily did more than Windsor required and fully
litigated his federal claims in the state courts." Id. at 421.
76 Id. at 435.

NOTES
England's reservation requirement could in some cases trap the unwary, it does
go far toward assuring a federal forum for those who would be otherwise estopped
by the state court's determination of federal as well as state issues.
D. Uncertain State Law
The post-Thibodaux Supreme Court cases leave unanswered the very crucial
question of whether or not uncertainty of state law, without exceptional circumstances, is in itself justification for using the doctrine of abstention. In the recent
case of McNeese v. Board of Educ.7 the Supreme Court declared: "Yet where
congress creates a head of federal jurisdiction which entails a responsibility to
adjudicate the claim on the basis of state law, viz., diversity of citizenship . .. we
hold that difficulties and perplexities of state law are no reason for referral of the
2
problem to the state court."7
(Emphasis added) This comment is consistent with
the traditional view that the diversity statute imposes upon the federal courts a
duty to hear and determine the case before it when its jurisdiction has been
properly invoked. But the Court makes no mention of the situation in which state
law is not merely "difficult" but "uncertain,"- namely, where there is absolutely
no state authority upon which to base a federal court interpretation of state law.
The United States Courts of Appeals since 1959 have generally used the "exceptional circumstances" test as a vehicle for determining when abstention ought
be employed.7 9 A pending suit before a state court involving the same subject
matter continued to be viewed as an insufficient reason for abstention. 0 Where
state law was not obscure the Second and Fifth Circuits would not abstain.a
Where a mere contract between two parties was in question, and not federal-state
comity, the doctrine was not used;8 2 but if comity were involved and state law
obscure, abstention would be employed. ss
A few federal appellate decisions might be characterized as "liberal." In
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. City of North Kansas City, Mo.,8 4 the
court held that Thibodaux was authority for abstention in actions at law. Further,
abstention could be initially requested on appeal. However, in doubtful cases this
delay may be a consideration in refusing to use the doctrine. This court also
recognized the merit of retaining jurisdiction as a method of disposition once the
determination has been made to abstain.
Two recent Fifth Circuit decisions have strikingly expanded the uses of the
abstention doctrine. The first was Green v. American Tobacco Co. 5 This diversity
case involved the liability of a cigarette manufacturer for the death of plaintiff's
decedent caused by lung cancer. The court abstained in order to ascertain, through
Florida's certification procedure,6 the manufacturer's liability under Florida law.
This procedure had already received the warm approval of the Supreme Court in
Clay v. Sun Ins. Office Ltd.17 - an enthusiasm not shared by all the commen77 373 U.S. 668 (1963).
78 Id. at 673, n. 5.
79 E.g., Mach-Tronics, Inc. v. Zirpoli, 316 F.2d 820, 824 (9th Cir. 1963); Lutes v. United
States District Court For West. Dist. of Okla., 306 F.2d 948, 950 (10th Cir. 1962); Beach v.
Rome Trust Co., 269 F.2d 367, 374 (2d Cir. 1959).
80 See Banco Nacional De Cuba v. Sabbatino, 307 F.2d 845, 854 (2d Cir.), reu'd, 376
U.S. 398 (1964).
81 E.g., Beach v. Rome Trust Co., 269 F.2d 367, 374 (2d Cir. 1959); Orleans Parish
School Bd.v. Bush, 268 F.2d 78, 80 (5th Cir. 1959).
82 See Lutes v. United States District Court For West. Dist. of Okla., 306 F.2d 948 (10th

Cir. 1962).
83

1959).

See American Airlines, Inc. v. Louisville & Jefferson C.A.B., 269 F.2d 811 (6th Cir.

84 276 F.2d 932 (8th Cir. 1960).
85 304 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1962).
86 1 A FLA. STAT. ANN. § 25.031 (1961) declares:
The Supreme Court of this state may, by rile of court, provide that,
when itshall appear to the Supreme Court of the United States, to any
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tators8 8 The Supreme Court's implied invitation to make greater use of the certification procedure was not lost on the Fifth Circuit.
In Green there was uncertain state law but no constitutional issue nor question
of state comity. Since uncertainty, heretofore an inadequate basis, is the only
reason for abstention, one suspects that the circuit court must have been relying
on the Florida certification procedure. A federal court may feel that in having a
certification procedure available the evil of a long delay in state courts has been
eliminated and, thus, it may choose to abstain. But the Florida legislature does not
invest the federal court with authority to abstain. The decision to abstain must
be predicated upon the power of the federal judiciary to do so. It follows that if a
federal court has authority to abstain in this case where certification procedure is
available, then it also has that authority in the ordinary case involving uncertain
state law.
The second decision United Services Life Ins. Co. v. Delaney, 9 involved the

interpretation of an insurance contract. The court noted that the law of Texas was
obscure and directed the parties to initiate declaratory judgment proceedings in
the state court. The court declared that:
The guidance of the dim light of the Texas decision leaves the meaning

of the questioned decisions obscure. Without further enlightenment any

judgment we might pronounce would be "a forecast rather than a determination." [Citation Omitted] The Supreme Court has "increasingly recognized the wisdom of staying action in the federal courts pending determination by a state court of decisive issues of state law." [Citing Louisiana Power
& Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux] It is appropriate that this Court stay its
hand until the Courts of the State of Texas shall have declared the law of the
State of Texas90 which is applicable to and controlling in the disposition of
these appeals.
Two alarmed judges dissented on the ground that diversity jurisdiction was not
made discretionary by the statute. Rather, the legislative mandate leaves room for

deviation only in "exceptional circumstances" within which, they believed, the
instant case did not fall.
Judge Brown wrote an interesting concurring opinion in which he emphasized
the concept of judicial discretion in the abstention area. 91 The doctrine of abstention
was to be used when in the exercise of judicial discretion a federal judge deemed
it appropriate. He viewed the difficulty or complexity of state law as a consideration
in the exercise of this discretion. This complexity of state law was not to be deter-mined by a superfluous inquiry but by a close analysis of the given case.

87

circuit court of appeals of the United States, or to the court of appeals of
the District of Columbia, that there are involved in any proceeding before
it questions or propositions of the laws of this state, which are determinative
of the said cause, and there are no clear controlling precedents in the decisions of the supreme court of this state, such federal court may certify such
questions or propositions of the laws of this state to the supreme court of
this state for instructions concerning such questions or propositions of state
law, which certificate the supreme court of this state, by written opinion,
may answer.
363 U.S. 207 (1960).
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WRIGHT, FEDERAL CouRTs, § 52 at 176 (1st ed. 1963) says:

The certification procedure has been regarded with quite an extraordinary enthusiasm by the commentators. Quite aside from the expense and
delay this procedure causes, the constitutional difficulty in many states in
giving what is inevitably no more than an advisory opinion, and the unsatisfactory experience courts in general have had with certified questions, necessarily abstract and divorced from a concrete factual setting suggest that
certification is an undesirable innovation if it will lead to abrogation of the
Meredith doctrine.

89 328 F.2d 483 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 935 (1964) (Mr. Justice Douglas of
the opinion that certiorari should be granted).
90 Id. at 484-85.
91

"Abstention is neither abandonment of duty, on the one hand, nor a problem of raw

power, on the other. It is judge-fashioned and being such, the cloth should be cut to pattern." Id. at 485.

NOTES
What does the majority of the court in Delaney mean when they say that
the law of Texas is "obscure"? If "obscure" is taken to mean that the interpretation
of state law is "difficult," then the Delaney holding is directly opposed to the
teaching of Meredith v. City of Winter Haven,92 as recently reaffirmed in McNeese93
which states the orthodox view that mere difficulty is insufficient.
Delaney used the abstention doctrine in a private contract suit involving uncertain state law without the presence of a constitutional issue or question of federalstate comity. If Judge Brown's concurring opinion were accepted as rationale for
this decision, the new test would be one resting in the discretionary power of a
federal judge to determine when abstention is proper. Such a rationale without
qualification is an extreme approach in light of the Meredith holding and the traditional mandate theory of jurisdiction.
The Fifth Circuit cases of Clay and Delaney suggest the need for a reevaluation of the abstention doctrine as to "when" and under "what circumstances"
it should be invoked. Thibodaux, at least as interpreted by the Fifth Circuit, has
cast doubt upon the current status of Meredith and the "exceptional circumstances
doctrine." A failure to re-evaluate the doctrine by the Supreme Court may be taken
to mean a tacit approval of the Fifth Circuit's interpretation and may open the
door for cases of the Delaney variety in other circuits.
The problem remains that in many cases the federal courts must merely guess
at state law only to later find their decision overruled by the state supreme court.
"The reign of law is hardly promoted if an unnecessary ruling of federal court is
thus supplanted by a controlling decision of a state court."'9 4 Thus if state law is uncertain, the federal courts may have a valid reason for abstaining; yet if it is only
difficult they may be shirking a responsibility in the face of a troublesome decision.
But when is state law to be characterized as "uncertain"? Is it "uncertain" when
there is no state authority directly on point or when the federal court is called
upon to analyze state authorities in an analogous area of state law? What is an
analogous area of state law? If "uncertain" state law is to be allowed as a reason
for abstaining, it becomes imperative for the Supreme Court clearly to define what
is "uncertain" and what is "difficult." Such a definition could qualify Judge
Brown's discretion test and thus reconcile it with the traditional abstention approach. In any event, if the Supreme Court has in effect overruled Meredith by
its decision in Thibodaux it should say so9s and then proceed to define "uncertain"
state law.
IV. Conclusion
The abstention doctrine has undergone some notable changes since 1959.
The demise of the law-equity distinction and the England reservation of one's
right to a federal forum are two such changes. In the civil rights area the trend
appears to be away from abstention because of its abuse as a delaying tactic. The
unsolved problem area centers around "uncertain" state law. Some Fifth Circuit
decisions suggest that "uncertainty" of state law is itself a reason for abstaining.
However, the Supreme Court has not yet given explicit recognition to such an
approach. Whether it will do so or reiterate traditional abstention principles is
at best conjectural.
James T. Heimbuch
92 320 U.S. 228 (1943).
93 373 U.S. 668 (1963).
94 Railroad Comm'n of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500 (1941).
95 In England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 423 (1964),
Mr. Justice Douglas said in his concurring opinion:
The judge-made rule we announce today promises to have such a serious impact on litigants who are properly in the federal courts that I think
a reappraisal of Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co.,
from which today's
decision stems is necessary. Although the propriety of the Pullman doctrine,
either as originally decided or as it has evolved, has not been raised by the
parties, I think it is time for the Court, "sua sponte" to reevaluate it.

